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We use a French ¯rm-level panel data set over the period 1993-2004 to analyze the
relationship between credit constraints and ¯rms' R&D behavior over the business cycle.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) the share of R&D investment over total
investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes more procyclical
as ¯rms face tighter credit constraints; (ii) the result is magni¯ed for ¯rms in sectors
that depend more heavily upon external ¯nance; (iii) in more credit constrained ¯rms,
R&D investment share plummets during recessions but does not increase proportionally
during upturns; (iv) average R&D investment and productivity growth are more negatively
correlated with sales volatility in more credit constrained ¯rms.
JEL classi¯cation: E22, E32, O16, O30, O32.
Keywords: business cycles, R&D, credit constraints, volatility.I Introduction
A Schumpeterian view of business cycles and growth, is that recessions provide a cleansing
mechanism for correcting organizational ine±ciencies and for encouraging ¯rms to reorganize,
innovate or reallocate to new markets. The cleansing e®ect of recessions is also to eliminate
those ¯rms that are unable to reorganize or innovate. Schumpeter1 himself would summarize
that view as follows; \[Recessions] are but temporary. They are means to reconstruct each time
the economic system on a more e±cient plan". This of course assumes that ¯rms can always
borrow enough funds to either reorganize their activities or move to new activities and markets.
Without credit constraints, investment choices are indeed dictated by an opportunity-cost e®ect:
namely, the opportunity cost of long-term innovative investments instead of short-term capital
investments, is lower in recessions than in booms. Hence, the share of long-term investment
in total investment should be countercyclical, whereas the share of short-term investment is
procyclical (see Hall (1993), Gali and Hammour (1992), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Bean
(1990), Bloom (2007)).
However, as emphasized by Aghion et al. (2005), henceforth AABM, things become quite
di®erent when credit market imperfections prevent ¯rms from innovating and reorganizing in
recessions. In particular, suppose that ¯rms can choose between short-run capital investment
and long-term R&D investment, that innovating requires that ¯rms survive short-run liquidity
shocks, and that to cover liquidity costs ¯rms can rely only on their short-run earnings plus
borrowing. Whenever the ¯rm is hit by a bad (idiosyncratic or aggregate) shock, its current
earnings are reduced, and therefore so is the ¯rms' ability to borrow in order to innovate. This
in turn implies that a negative shock should hit R&D investments and innovation more in ¯rms
that are more credit constrained. In other words, R&D investments should be expected to be
1See Schumpeter (1942).
2more procyclical in ¯rms facing tighter credit constraints.
In this paper, we test this prediction using a French ¯rm-level panel data set that contains
information both, on the extent of credit constraints at the ¯rm level each year, and on R&D
investments by the ¯rm, relative to total investment. The ¯rm-level database we use has been
collected by the Banque de France. The sample includes about 13,000 ¯rms (all of them having
at least one time a positive R&D investment) and covers the period 1993-2004. The database
contains an important number of small and medium ¯rms that are particularly prone to be
hit by credit constraints, and are thus especially relevant for the study of the above-mentioned
mechanisms. The most interesting feature of this dataset is that it contains information on
credit constraints at the ¯rm level. More speci¯cally, ¯rms that fail to repay their trade creditors
are identi¯ed on a list to which banks have access. Our ¯rst stage regression shows that being
noti¯ed on that list under the heading "incident de paiement", is negatively and signi¯cantly
correlated with a ¯rm's access to future loans.
Once equipped with this ¯rm-level information on credit access, we regress ¯rm R&D over
total investment on ¯rm sales and its interaction with credit constraints. Our main results from
second stage regressions can be summarized as follows: (i) the share of R&D investment over
total investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, and it becomes more procyclical
as ¯rms face tighter credit constrained; (iii) this e®ect is only observed during downturns:
namely, in presence of credit constraints, R&D investment share plummets during recessions
but it does not increase proportionally during upturns; (iv) the level of R&D investment is
lower in more credit constrained ¯rms whatever the ¯rm's position within the business cycle -
but it decreases more during recessions. Therefore, credit constraints, by preventing the R&D
share from being countercyclical, may amplify the business cycle, increase productivity growth
volatility and decrease average productivity growth.
3This paper relates to a broader literature on cycles, innovation and growth. The theoretical
papers that are most closely related to our approach in this paper, are Hall (1991), Gali and
Hammour (1992), Caballero and Hammour (1994), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Francois
and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), Comin and Gertler (2006), Barlevy (2004), and Barlevy (2007). All
these papers take a Schumpeterian approach to the relationship between growth and cycles,
however they do not emphasize credit constraints. The empirical literature on the subject starts
with Ramey and Ramey (1995) who provide cross-country evidence of a negative relationship
between volatility and growth. More closely related to the analysis in this paper is AABM.
Based on cross-country panel data over the period 1960-2000, AABM show that structural
investment (another proxy for growth-enhancing investment) is more procyclical in countries
with lower ratios of credit to GDP, and that the correlation between macroeconomic volatility
(measured as in Ramey and Ramey (1995) by the variance of growth rate) and average growth,
is more negative the lower ¯nancial development. However, unlike in this paper, the data in
AABM do not include R&D investments, and moreover credit constraints are not measured
at the ¯rm level. Prior evidence on R&D investments over the cycle, is provided by Griliches
(1990), Comin and Gertler (2006), and Barlevy (2007), although not in relation to ¯rms' credit
constraints2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model to derive our main
predictions. Section 3 presents the data and the measurement variables. Section 4 presents
the ¯rst stage analysis, where we regress credit access on ¯rms' past credit records. Section 5
presents the second stage results. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results and their
implications for productivity growth and volatility, and it concludes.
2Barlevy (2007) ¯nds no evidence of current cash °ows a®ecting how ¯rms'current R&D investments respond
to the business cycle. However, in Barlevy's own estimations, lagged cash °ows turn out to signi¯cantly a®ect
how current R&D investment reacts to the ¯rm's current position in the business cycle.
4II Model
1 Basic environment
There is a continuum of overlapping-generations of two period lived entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
are risk-neutral and maximize intertemporal wealth.
An entrepreneur born at date t faces a sales shock at at time t and at+1 at time t+1; where
at 2 fa;ag;
and
p = Pr(at+1 = a=at = a)
= Pr(at+1 = a=at = a)
is strictly less than one but greater than 1/2 so that there is some persistence to a sales shock
over time.
At the beginning of her ¯rst period, an entrepreneur born at date t decides about: (i) short-
run capital investment kt; which yields short run pro¯t atkt at cost 1
2dk2
t at the end of the ¯rst
period, and; (ii) long-term R&D investment zt , which yields an innovation value vt+1 equal to
the expected productivity E(at+1=at) in period (t+1) with probability zt in the second period,
at cost 1
2cz2
t. Credit market imperfections may prevent a ¯rm with short-run pro¯t °ow atkt
from investing more than ¹atkt in R&D, where ¹ ¸ 1 measures the extent to which the ¯rm
can borrow using its ¯rst period return as collateral.
52 Pro¯t maximization and optimal investments
Consider ¯rst the benchmark case where the entrepreneur is not credit constrained. Then she
will choose k and z to
max
k;z
fatk + E(at+1=at)z ¡
1
2
dk
2 ¡
1
2
cz
2g;
which yields
dk = at; (1)
cz = E(at+1=at) = pat + (1 ¡ p)a¡t; (2)
where
a¡t 6= at
In particular, given that p < 1; the ratio
z
k
=
d
c
E(at+1=at)
at
=
d
c
[p + (1 ¡ p)
a¡t
at
] (3)
is countercyclical, that is, lower when sales are high with at = a than when sales are low with
at = a: This is the opportunity cost e®ect already mentioned in the introduction.
Now, consider the case where the entrepreneur is credit-constrained. Then she will choose
k and z to
max
k;z
fatk + E(at+1=at)z ¡
1
2
dk
2 ¡
1
2
cz
2g
s:t: z · ¹kat :
6The credit-constraint is binding whenever the equilibrium R&D level in the absence of credit
constraint, is higher than ¹kat in equilibrium; that is, whenever:
E(at+1=at)
c
> ¹
(at)2
d
:
This latter condition, which can be reexpressed as
1
c
[p + (1 ¡ p)
a¡t
at
] > ¹
at
d
; (4)
is more likely to be satis¯ed when the ¯rms faces a low sales shock (with at = a and a¡t = a)
than when it faces a high sales shock (with at = a and a¡t = a):
Suppose ¯rst that the credit constraint binds only when sales are low. Then the ratio of
R&D over capital investment z
k is necessarily procyclical. To see this, note that: (i) when
at = a, this ratio is unconstrained and thus from (3) it is equal to:
(
z
k
)
higha =
d
c
[p + (1 ¡ p)
a
a
];
(ii) when at = a the credit constraint is binding so that the R&D/capital ratio is equal to
(
z
k
)
lowa = ¹a;
(iii) our assumption that (4) is satis¯ed for at = a; which immediately implies that
(
z
k
)
lowa < (
z
k
)
higha:
Another predictions in this case is that a lower ¹ reduces (z
k)lowa without a®ecting (z
k)higha:
7Thus, lowering ¹ will result in a lower equilibrium R&D investment reduced in a low sales
shock, whereas the R&D investment is unchanged in a high sales shock.
Overall, the R&D/capital ratio will be more procyclical in a ¯rm facing tighter credit con-
straints, and that this ¯rm will also invest relatively less in R&D on average over time. These
predictions will be validated by our empirical analysis in the next sections.
Now, suppose that condition (4) is always binding. Then the equilibrium R&D/capital ratio
remains procyclical, with
(
z
k
)
lowa = ¹a < (
z
k
)
higha = ¹a:
However, in this case, a lower ¹ will reduce the R&D/capital ratio z
k more when the ¯rm faces
high sales (when at = a) than when it faces low sales (at = a) since
d
d¹
[(
z
k
)
higha ¡ (
z
k
)
lowa] = a ¡ a > 0:
This case is not the most plausible, as we can expect ¯rms to be less credit-constrained in
high than in low-sales states. And indeed our empirical analysis will not support this latter
prediction that tightening credit constraints should reduce the R&D share of investment by
more in upturns than in downturns.
To complete our analysis of the model, we can derive the equilibrium R&D investment under
high and low current sales respectively. If the credit constraint does not bind, then from (2)
we have:
z =
E(at+1=at)
c
:
8And if it binds one can show that3:
z =
1
d + c(¹at)2¹(at)
2[1 + ¹E(at+1=at)]:
It then follows that R&D is procyclical when the credit constraint binds in the low sales
state. This is obvious when the ¯rm is also constrained in the high sales state, as:
a2
d + c(¹a)2 >
a2
d + c(¹a)2
and
[1 + ¹(pa + (1 ¡ p)a)] < [1 + ¹(pa + (1 ¡ p)a)]
when p > 1=2: It is a fortiori true when the ¯rm is constrained in the low sales state only since
the credit constraint a®ects the R&D investment primarily.
3To see this, note that when the credit constraint binds, we have
z = ¹kat
so that the optimal capital investment k solves:
max
k
fatk + E(at+1=at)¹kat ¡
1
2
dk2 ¡
1
2
c(¹kat)2g:
From ¯rst order condition we get:
k =
1
d + c(¹at)2at[1 + ¹E(at+1=at)]
and therefore
z = ¹kat
=
¹
d + c(¹at)2(at)2[1 + ¹E(at+1=at)]:
93 Main theoretical predictions
The main predictions that emerge from our analysis in this section can be summarized as
follows:
1. A ¯rm's (relative) R&D investment is more procyclical (in the sense that it reacts more
positively to the ¯rm's current sales), the more credit-constrained the ¯rm is.
2. Tighter credit constraints interact with sales in an asymmetric fashion over the business
cycle. In particular, starting from a situation where credit constraints are more binding
in downturns, a tightening of credit-constraints or an increase in the volatility of sales,
reduce the ¯rm's R&D investment more in a downturn than it might increase it in an
upturn. It thus reduces the ¯rm's average R&D investment.
In the remaining part of the paper we take these predictions to French ¯rm-level panel data.
III Data
Our empirical analysis merges two di®erent French-¯rm-level datasets: FiBen and the payment
incident dataset, which we now describe in more details.
1 The FiBEn database
Our core data comes from FiBEn, a large French-¯rm-level database constructed by the Banque
de France. FiBEn is based on ¯scal documents, including balance sheet and P&L statement, and
thus contains detailed information on both, °ow and stock accounting variables. A subsample
of FiBEn, called Centrale des Bilans, is available for a lower number of ¯rms and includes
10additional information directly collected by the Banque de France. This additional data will
allow us to perform additional consistency and accuracy tests.
The FiBen database includes all French ¯rms which sales at least equal to 75,000 euros or
with credit outstanding of at least 38,000 euros; annual accounting data are then available for
about 200,000 ¯rms. In 2004, FiBEn covered 80% of the ¯rms with 20 to 500 employees, and
98% of those employing more than 500 employees4.
We then restrict our sample by looking only at ¯rms that have at least one year a positive
R&D investment; our sample is unbalanced and includes about 13,000 ¯rms over the period
1993-2004. A same ¯rm appears in our database during a seven year period on average.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for our key variables, including the R&D share of
investment, and the measure of credit constraint we use in the empirical analysis; this measure,
which is referred to as "payment incident", will be described and analyzed in details in the two
next subsections.
Our ¯nal sample includes an important number of small and medium ¯rms5, that are par-
ticularly prone to be hit by credit constraints.
4More than 50% of the ¯rms in FiBEn have less than 20 employees. However, these ¯rms are under-
represented in FiBEn since their sales rarely exceed the required amount.
5The median size is of around 30 employees per ¯rm.
112 R&D variable
Among the variables for which FiBEn data are available, we choose to concentrate on R&D
investment rather than R&D expenditures as a proxy for long-term, productivity-enhancing
investment. R&D investments are a fraction of R&D expenditures that the ¯rms are allowed
to capitalize. The reason for relying on this measure is twofold. First, it makes the ratio of
R&D investment over total investment, which is central in our study, more homogenous. Sec-
ond, R&D investment is much more volatile than R&D expenditures, since the latter include
in an important way researchers wages that are more stable along the business cycle. Note
that the accounting behavior of ¯rms should not been a®ected by changes in the ¯scal envi-
ronment: the R&D ¯scal rules has not been signi¯cantly altered during the studied period6.
Using R&D investment, we check that the sectoral R&D intensity is as expected (that is the
lowest for agriculture and the highest for services to businesses that include business software
developments).
We also check whether our variable has a positive long-term e®ect on TFP growth. Table 3
shows a clear positive correlation. An increase of the ratio R&D investment over value added is
associated with a signi¯cant rise of future TFP growth. The ratio R&D over total investment
also has a positive and signi¯cant impact.
[Table 3 about here]
3 Payment incidents
Direct ¯rm-level information on credit constraints is not available in France. However, we could
derive an indirect measure of credit constraints, as follows. Since its introduction in 1992, all
French banks have a legal obligation to report any previous default on trade creditors to the
6The main reforms have been implemented during the ¯scal years 1990 and in 2005.
12\Systµ eme Interbancaire de T¶ el¶ ecompensation" within four business days. These defaults on
trade credit are called payment incidents (henceforth PI). The Banque de France aggregates
this information and makes it available to all commercial banks through a weekly paper or an
electronic report automatically sent to all bank agencies. Also, since 1992, through a speci¯c
commercial network system, banks can immediately access these reports covering the last 12
months; access is through internet since 2000. The complete longitudinal dataset is available
for research only at the Bank of France.
Banks are thus supposed to adapt their credit supply to this information, in particular they
typically reduce future lending to defaulting ¯rms. Our proxy for credit constraints is a binary
variable equal to 1 when the ¯rm has experienced at least one payment incident during the
previous year, and to zero otherwise. This variable is easy to interpret and weakly correlated to
our other key variables (see Table 13 in appendix). About 7% of ¯rms experience each year at
least one payment incident, and about one third of ¯rms in our sample has experienced at least
one payment incident over the overall period. All sectors are concerned by payment incidents,
especially manufacturing motor vehicles that includes small and medium subcontractors facing
the strong cyclicality of this industry. Conversely, real estate ¯rms are less a®ected by the
business cycle and experience fewer payment incidents (table 2).
Our descriptive statistics table (1) shows that credit constrained ¯rms (here de¯ned as the
¯rms that have experienced at least 1 payment incident during the period) display a lower ratio
of R&D investment over total investments, and a higher volatility (measured by the standard
deviation) of sales. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions: if credit constraints
are in action, the share of productivity-enhancing investment over total investment turns less
countercyclical (or even procyclical). Credit constraints thus prevent R&D from having a
smoothing e®ect on productivity and magni¯es the business cycle - sales are more volatile. We
13con¯rm these stylized facts in the next sections.
IV First stage: Payment Incidents as a proxy for credit
constraints
In this section we investigate the e®ect of experiencing a payment incident (PI) on future bank
loans. More precisely, we study the impact of having experienced at least one PI during the
two previous years (t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 2) both on the probability to contract a new bank loan, and
on the amount of this loan. We estimate the following speci¯cation:
BkLi;t = ®1PIi;t¡1 + ®2PIi;t¡2 + ¯jXi;t¡1 + ¹t + ½i + ²i;t (5)
where BkLi;t ¸ 0 represents the amount of new bank loans contracted by ¯rm i during year
t, PIi;t¡1 is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever ¯rm i had a payment incident during year
t¡1, and Xi;t¡1 is a set of controls that includes various determinants of bank loans supply. In
particular, we control for ¯rm size (number of employees) and its squared value, for the ¯rm's
cash-°ow, and for collateral and the ¯rm's dependence upon bank ¯nance (banking debt over
total debt)7. All these variables are lagged.
We expect the supply of bank loans to be higher for ¯rms with higher cash °ow and collateral.
Size may have a non-linear e®ect - i.e. a lower positive e®ect on credit supply at higher levels.
Finally, we expect the estimated coe±cients on the PI variable to be negative - banks are
7A more detailed description of the computation of these di®erent variables is provided in the Appendix -
Table 12.
14supposed to reduce their credit supply to defaulting ¯rms.
We also include a full set of year dummies to account for time speci¯c e®ects, and estimate
the equation with ¯rms' ¯xed e®ects. Alternatively, we use a GMM procedure; we also assess
separately the impact of having experienced a payment incident in the past, on both, the access
to new bank loans (by using a Logit estimation) and on the amount of this loan (by using a
left-censored, Tobit estimation). Finally, we replace the dependent variable \new bank loans"
by the share of long term loans over total loans. The idea here is that credit constrained ¯rms
have relatively more short term loans as banks are more reluctant to give them long terms ones.
We thus expect the coe±cient on PI to be negative in this latter estimation.
Our speci¯cation only takes into account supply factors in explaining ¯rms' new bank loans'.
However, our regressors may be correlated with factors which a®ect ¯rms' demand for new loans.
In particular, the demand for credit should be positively correlated with ¯rms' investment
demand, which itself should be positively correlated with current sales. To partly capture this
demand e®ect, we introduce lagged sales variation, and the lag of the share of R&D investment
over value added as additional controls.
[Table 4 about here]
Results are shown in Table 4. The estimated coe±cients on control variables have the
expected sign: a larger cash °ow, size and collateral are all positively correlated with banks
credit supply (columns (a) to (d)). Results are qualitatively unchanged when controlling for
past sales variations (columns (i) and (j)). Having experienced a payment incident during
the previous year has a negative and signi¯cant impact, both on the probability to contract
a new loan (logit estimation, column (l)) and on the size of the loan (within estimations). In
the last two columns we decompose the marginal e®ects computed from a left-censored tobit
15estimation of the previous speci¯cation in two subcomponents: namely, the marginal e®ect on
the probability to contract a new loan and the e®ect on the size of the loan. Having experienced
a payment incident has more negative impact both on the size of the loan than on the probability
to contract a new loan. We also ¯nd that having experienced a payment incident two years
before does not have any impact on credit supply8. One potential explanation for this latter
¯nding is that the electronic service provided by the Bank of France gives commercial banks
access to only the past year PI. Note that the introduction of the convivial internet access in
2000 does not seem to have modi¯ed the correlation between PI and credit supply between
before and after 2000 (columns (f) and (g)). Finally, our results exhibit a negative correlation
between PI and the share of long-term debt in total debt - an especially important fact since we
will study in the next part the e®ect of credit constraints on the share of long-run investment.
These ¯ndings are consistent with the idea of a signi¯cant impact of payment incidents on
credit supply. We shall build on these results in our second-stage analysis, in which we use the
binary variable equal to 1 whenever the ¯rm has experienced at least one PI in year t ¡ 1, as
our proxy for credit constraint in year t.
As we explain in more details in the next section, this measure of credit constraint is not
immune from potential endogeneity problems. In particular, both the composition of investment
and the fact of having experienced a payment incident, may result from the existence of omitted
variables. For example the ¯rm may decide that a given activity is no longer worth pursuing,
and as a result reduce both, its R&D investment and also its diligence vis-a-vis trade creditors
in that activity. To deal with the endogeneity problem and further con¯rm the relevance of
payment incidents as a proxy for credit constraints, we use the Rajan and Zingales (1998)'s
8We also tried to determine whether the number of payment incidents or the extent of the unpaid trade
credits play a role; we ¯nd that payment incidents have nearly the same e®ects on R&D share over the business
cycle no matter the number or magnitude of incidents.
16industry-level measure of ¯nancial external dependence9. More precisely, we shall run our
second-stage estimations on two di®erent sub-samples, respectively containing highly and lowly
dependent sectors. We explain our methodology in more details in the next section.
V Second stage: credit constraints and the cyclicality of
R&D investment
In this section we use our PI measure of credit constraints to test our main theoretical predic-
tions. In particular we will show that: (1) the R&D / investment ratio is more procyclical for
¯rms facing tighter credit constraints; (2) this procyclicality e®ect tends to be asymmetric: it
operates mainly during low sales states. The next section will discuss robustness checks and
implications of our results, in particular for the e®ect of volatility on the level of R&D and on
average productivity growth in credit-constrained ¯rms.
1 Proposition 1: Cyclicality of the R&D share and credit constraints
1.1 Speci¯cation
We test our ¯rst proposition by estimating the following speci¯cation:
RDi;t
Ii;t + RDi;t
= ®0 + ¯1¢si;t + ¯2¢si;t¡1 + ¯3¢sit¡2 + µPIi;t¡1+
°1¢si;t ¤ PIi;t¡1 + °2¢si;t¡1 ¤ PIi;t¡1 + °3¢si;t¡2 ¤ PIi;t¡1 + ¹t + ºi + "it (6)
9See Rajan and Zingales (1998). The RZ indicator measures the extent to which the corresponding sector
in the US is more or less dependent upon external ¯nance.
17where RDit represents R&D investment (used as a proxy for long-term, productivity enhancing
investment), Ii;t+RDi;t total investment (physical plus R&D investment), PIi;t¡1 the payment
incident dummy (used as a proxy for credit constraints), and ¢sit the variation in sales10 of
¯rm i during year t. We control for time ¯xed e®ects ¹t
11, and for ¯rms ¯xed e®ects.
We thus analyze the interacted impact of sales cycles and credit constraints on the composi-
tion of investment. Based on our theoretical analysis, we expect the share of R&D investment
to be countercyclical in the absence of credit constraints; we thus expect ¯1 < 0 and
P
¯i < 0.
However, credit constraints are supposed to reverse the cyclicality of investment composition:
they should lead to a more procyclical long-run investment (°1 > 0,
P
°i > 0). Finally, by
themselves credit constraints have an uncertain e®ect on investment composition. For example,
a ¯rm may reduce its demand for short-run investment more when it is credit constrained; but
long-run investment should also be negatively a®ected by credit supply. Thus, we do not expect
a particular sign or signi¯cance on µ.
As mentioned before, we estimate the equation with ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. The results are almost
unchanged when using a Random e®ects / GLS methodology with sector and size dummies12.
Moreover, taking into account the important share of zero-values in our R&D variable by
estimating the previous speci¯cation using a left-censored Tobit does not change the results
qualitatively either.
However, a potential bias arises when using the within estimator, since some of the inde-
10De¯ned as: Log(Salest) ¡ Log(Salest¡1):
11We also included year£sector dummies to account for sectoral shocks such as privatization. Results were
una®ected.
12The inclusion of these controls in a within estimation does not add much since sectors and size speci¯c
e®ects are already captured by the ¯rms' ¯xed e®ects.
18pendent variables - in particular ¢si;t - may be simultaneously determined with the dependant
variable. More speci¯cally, it seems clearly unlikely that investment and sales would not be
simultaneous to some extent. A solution to this bias is to use an instrumental variable (IV)
methodology, where the instruments are an appropriated set of lagged values of the variables.
This in turn argues in favor of using the GMM method, at least to control for the robustness
of our results. We thus replicate each basic result using the Arellano and Bond (1995) estima-
tor. The validity of the instruments is veri¯ed by the classical Sargan test for over-identifying
restrictions.
1.2 Results
Columns a, b and c in Table 5 report the within estimations of the potential impact of sales
changes on the composition of investment. These estimations include current sales shocks and
up to two-period lagged shocks.
These ¯rst results show a countercyclicality of the share of R&D in the investment spending.
A 10 percent change in current sales induces a modi¯cation in the opposite direction of the share
of R&D of 0,2 percentage point the same year, and also the next year, and still half of this e®ect
two years after. But the correlation vanishes for older shocks (regressions not reported). The
magnitude of the current impact of this 10 percent change in current sales is quite important:
about 4 % of the R&D average share. Finally, these results are robust to the use of GMM
estimators.
[Table 5 about here]
Introducing PI as an additional explanatory variable does not also alter the countercycli-
cality of the share of R&D in the investment spending. On its own, PI shows no signi¯cant
19impact on the R&D share in the within estimation, however using the GMM procedure makes
the payment incident coe±cient become signi¯cant and negative. This suggests that R&D in-
vestment tends to be more negatively a®ected than physical investment by the occurrence of
payment incidents. Intuitively, ¯rms with credit constraints tend to favor short-term invest-
ments relatively to long-term ones. Facing at least one payment incident the previous year may
be associated with a large drop of the share of R&D of 0,5 percentage point, about 10 % of the
R&D average share.
Now, when we interact PI with our sales shock variables, we obtain the desired results:
consistent with theoretical predictions, the share of R&D investment turns less countercyclical
in presence of credit constraints (Table 5, columns d, e and f).
To deal with potential endogeneity problems linked to the co-determination of sales and
investment, we ¯rst run GMM estimations (GMM, Table 5). This does not a®ect the results on
the R&D share cyclicality - on the contrary, the interaction term between sales variations and
payment incident becomes signi¯cant in t ¡ 1. However, the Sargan test rejects the validity of
our instruments, in line with previous work emphasizing the weakness of GMM instruments in
this kind of estimations13.
1.3 Robustness
As already mentioned in the previous section, another source of endogeneity lies in the possi-
bility that both, a ¯rm's investment structure and whether it is subject to a payment incident,
may hinge on some omitted variable. Note that the omitted variables have to be ¯rm-year
speci¯c (if not, it is captured by year or ¯rm ¯xed e®ects), and to co-determine PI in year t¡1
and the R&D share of investment in year t, without a®ecting the R&D share at t ¡ 1 in the
13See for example Mulkay et al. (2001).
20same way as it a®ects the R&D share at t (since the inclusion of a lagged term of the dependant
variable does not modify the results). These variables cannot be sector-year speci¯c since the
inclusion of sector-year dummies leaves the results unchanged.
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we use the sectoral ¯nancial dependence
indicator of Rajan and Zingales (1998). More precisely, we run the last set of estimations
on two di®erent sub-samples, respectively consisting of sectors with analogs in the US that
are more (above median) and less (below median) ¯nancially dependent. Our idea is here
twofold. First, there is a priori no reason for this endogeneity bias to be di®erently distributed
across sectors with di®erent levels of external dependence, that is, for the omitted variable to
a®ect PI(t-1) and the structure of investment in year t (with the above restrictions) only in
sectors that are more dependent upon external ¯nance. Second, the previous results should be
exacerbated in more ¯nancially dependent sectors. Hence, getting more signi¯cant results on
the ¯nancially dependent sub-sample, would suggest both that the endogeneity bias is weak
and that payment incident is indeed a good proxy for ¯rm-level credit constraints. We then
repeat the same exercise, but dividing up our sample according to ¯rms' collateral. Thus,
we run separated estimations for ¯rms with higher (above median) and lower (below median)
collateral and expect stronger correlations in the latter sub-sample. Collateral is computed as
the sum of ¯xed and tangible assets.
[Table 6 about here]
Results provided in table 6 show that the share of R&D investment becomes more procyclical
in presence of credit constraint only for ¯rms in sectors that are more dependent upon external
¯nance or in ¯rms with lower collateral (columns (b) and (c)). Estimated coe±cients are
insigni¯cant for ¯rms the other sub-samples. This in turn suggests a causal e®ect of credit
21constraints on the procyclicality of R&D investments.
2 Proposition 2: Asymmetry between positive and negative shocks
2.1 Speci¯cation
The interactions terms in the previous tables need to be interpreted with precaution: their
positive signs can mean either that credit constraints prevent ¯rms from increasing their R&D
share in downturns, or that ¯rms increase more this share during upturns periods when they
are ¯nancially constrained.
In this section, we disentangle the up- and downturns e®ects and show that the e®ect of
credit constraints on the R&D share depends upon the ¯rm's position within its business cycle.
Intuitively, one expects this e®ect to be stronger during downturns as credit constraints are
more likely to be binding in that case. More speci¯cally, we decompose the sales variation
variable in two components: downturns (¯rst quartile of sales variations) and upturns (last
quartile). We implicitly assume that a large negative shock leads to the equivalent of our a
whereas a large positive shock leads to the equivalent of our a:
We expect credit constraints to prevent ¯rms from increasing their R&D share mainly dur-
ing downturns, thus it is the interaction terms between this variable and payments incidents
that should be most positive and signi¯cant. The speci¯cation becomes:
RDi;t
Ii;t + RDi;t
= ®0 +
2 X
j=0
³
®j¢s
H
i;t¡j + °j¢s
L
i;t¡j
´
+ ®4PIi;t¡1+
2 X
j=0
³
µj¢s
H
i;t¡j ¤ PIi;t¡1 + ¸j¢s
L
i;t¡j ¤ PIi;t¡1
´
+ ¹t + ºi + "it (7)
22where ¢sH
i;t equals sales variations if the ¯rm is above its mean value for this variable, and
to 0 otherwise; ¢sL
i;t equals sales variations if the ¯rm is below its mean, 0 otherwise. We also
use another decomposition of sales shocks, by sector: in this case, ¢sH
i;t equals sales variations
if the ¯rm is above the third quartile (computed by sector) of this variable and zero otherwise;
similarly ¢sL
i;t equals sales variations if the ¯rm below the ¯rst quartile, and zero otherwise14.
Our contention is that credit constraints should play a more important role during recessions
(¸j > 0, ¸j > µj ).
2.2 Results
[Table 7 about here]
Results are provided in table 7. In particular we see that the interaction term between sales
variation and PI is signi¯cant only for lower shocks. Furthermore, the share of R&D investment
turns procyclical15 for the lower shocks in case of a PI while it is countercyclical when no PI
occurs. A 10 percent drop in current sales in a ¯rm experiencing a PI in the previous year,
induces a signi¯cant reduction of the share of R&D in total investment of about 0.25 point
(5%), but for a ¯rm that has not experienced PI this share falls down to 3%. Finally, whether
¯rms are subject to PI or not, the share of R&D in total investment becomes countercyclical
for large positive sales shocks. This is consistent with the view that ¯rms escape their credit
constraints thanks to upward positions in their business cycle. These results are robust to the
14We also tried with alternative decompositions, based on quartiles computed by year, of sector-year. The
results were qualitatively unchanged.
15This procyclicality is con¯rmed by a Wald test, showing that the coe±cient on ¢st is signi¯cantly lower
than the coe±cient on ¢st ¤ PI(t ¡ 1).
23alternative decomposition of the shocks16. Note also that the uninteracted e®ect of PI is not
a®ected by the decomposition.
3 Shock and cyclical position of the ¯rm
One objection to the previous estimation is the implicit assumption that the size of shocks
determines the position of the ¯rm within its business cycle. However, even if ¯rms are in the
low (resp. high) part of their business cycle (resp. high) they may experience large negative
(resp. positive) shocks.
To handle this caveat, we divide our sample according to the initial position of ¯rms. We
assume that a ¯rm is already lying on the upward (resp. downward) part of its cycle if the real
sales per employee are above (resp. below) its median.
² When a ¯rm lies initially in the upward part of its cycle at time t¡1, we expect: (i) that the
e®ect of a high sales shock alone should be either negative (the share of R&D investment
becomes more countercyclical as the ¯rm moves further up) or insigni¯cant (as the share
of R&D investment is low from the start); (ii) that the e®ect of a payment incident on
the R&D share is insigni¯cant as the credit constraint is essentially not binding; (iii) that
a low sales shock should signi¯cantly increase the share of R&D; (iv) ¯nally, that the
interaction e®ect between PI and a (small) sales shock should not be signi¯cant.
² When a ¯rm lies initially in the downward part of its cycle at t¡1, the interaction between
PI and a positive sales shock should become positive and signi¯cant.
[Table 8 about here]
16We also obtain similar qualitative results using GMM estimates (not presented, available on request).
24Results in Table 8 are consistent with these predictions and our previous estimations. What-
ever the initial position of the ¯rm, the correlation between a sales shock and the R&D share
is, as expected, non positive for ¯rms without PI and non negative for ¯rms a®ected by a PI.
In addition, if the initial position of the ¯rm is high, the coe±cients are signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero when the sales shock is adverse. Alternatively, if the initial position of the ¯rm is
low, the coe±cients are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero when the sales shock is positive.
VI Discussion and conclusions
In this section we discuss some extensions and implications of our analysis. First, we argue
that our main results carry over when we move from R&D share of investment to R&D levels:
in other words, the higher procyclicality of the R&D share in a more credit-constrained ¯rm,
is not primarily driven by a variation in its physical investment. Second, we move from R&D
share to ¯rm level productivity growth and analyze how this latter variable responds to sales
volatility interacted with ¯rm-level credit constraints.
1 From R&D share to R&D level
As total investments are not constant over the ¯rm's business cycle, our previous results do not
provide direct information on how the average level of R&D investment is a®ected by credit
constraints. For example, a procyclical R&D share would be consistent with the level of R&D
either increasing or decreasing, if it turned out that the amount of physical invesment increases
su±ciently during slumps.
To check that the reaction of the R&D share to sales volatility, indeed re°ects an adjustment
of the R&D level, we use the following speci¯cation:
25Ii;t
Ki;t¡1
= ®0+´1
Ii;t¡1
Ki;t¡2
+»1¢si;t+»2¢si;t¡1+®1PIi;t¡1+¯1¢si;t¤PIi;t¡1+¯2¢si;t¡1¤PIi;t¡1+¹t+ºi+"it
(8)
where Ii;t is physical investment, Ki;t denotes capital stock, and ¢si;t is the variation in sales of
¯rm i during year t. The dependent variable is the accumulation rate of physical capital. How
the level of R&D responds to sales shocks and their interaction with PI, is directly deductible
from these results. We estimate this equation with ¯rms and times ¯xed e®ects17.
We expect physical investment to be procyclical (»1;»2 > 0) and negatively a®ected by
credit constraints (®1 < 0). The signs of ¯1 and ¯2 provide direct information on the cyclical
variation of both physical investment and R&D in response to sales variations. If, unlike for
R&D investment, physical investment turns out to be a®ected by credit constraints in the same
way whatever the ¯rm's position within the business cycle (¯1;¯2 < 0) - then the results in
the previous section on the procyclicality of R&D share in more credit constrained ¯rms, must
carry over to the adjustment of R&D levels over the ¯rm's business cycle.
[Table 9 about here]
Our results are in line with these predictions. Table 9 shows that the level of physical
investment is procyclical, and negatively a®ected by credit constraints no matter the ¯rm's
17We also have estimated the e®ect of PI and its interaction with ¢st using structural investment equations
based on Mulkay et al. (2001). The results, available upon request, were qualitatively unchanged.
26location within the business cycle. More importantly, physical investments are uniformly af-
fected by credit constraint over the business cycle. This, together with our previous ¯ndings,
makes it clear that: (a) the average level of R&D investment decreases with sales volatility
when the ¯rm is more credit constrained; (b) this level decreases more in downturns for more
credit-constrained ¯rms.
2 From R&D to productivity growth
In this subsection we investigate the interacted e®ect of PI and sales shocks on ¯rm average
productivity growth. The prediction is that the interacted e®ect should be negative, with
growth in more credit constrained ¯rms responding more positively to a positive sales shock.
[Table 10 about here]
Results in Table 10 are in line with these predictions. First, the e®ect of adverse shocks
on average productivity growth for credit constrained ¯rms is negative: the variable shock
in this table is a dummy equal to 1 when the ¯rm has experienced both, an adverse shock
and a payment incident in year t ¡ 1; The table shows an estimated coe±cient of average
productivity growth on this variable which is negative and signi¯cant. When we control for
sectoral R&D intensity (captured by the mean of the share of R&D investment over total
investment, computed by sector), this coe±cient is no longer signi¯cant, whereas the interaction
term remains negative and signi¯cant. This suggests that the negative e®ect of adverse shocks
on productivity growth in credit constrained ¯rms, is related to the impact of those shocks on
long-term R&D investment.
[Table 11 about here]
27Additional evidence on the role of credit constraints in the relationship between business
cycles and productivity growth is presented in table 11, which presents cross-section estimations
of the correlation between the volatility of growth and average TFP growth over the period 1994-
2004. All estimations include controls for ¯rm size and sector dummies. The impact of growth
volatility alone is found to be insigni¯cant (column (a)), but turns negative in more ¯nancially
dependent industries (column (b)). In the last four columns we present separate estimations
for high (above median) and low (below median) R&D intensity sectors. Consistent with our
theoretical model, the negative impact of volatility on growth in more ¯nancially dependent
sectors appears only in R&D intensive industries, suggesting that credit constraints magnify the
negative impact of volatility on growth at least partly through their e®ects on R&D investment.
3 Policy implications
An important next step in this research program will be to study the e®ect of macro-policy
- both monetary and budgetary policies - on ¯rms' R&D behavior over the business cycle.
In particular, our regression results in Tables 6, 10 and 11 suggest that more countercyclical
macroeconomic policies (e.g with higher ¯scal de¯cits or lower interest rates in downturns)
should enhance R&D investments and productivity growth in ¯rms that are more credit con-
strained and more dependent upon external ¯nance. However, a systematic investigation of the
e®ects of macroeconomic policies on ¯rms' investment behavior is left for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, whole sample
Variable No Obs.No. Firms Mean S.D Q1 Median Q3
Whole Sample
No Employees 73,237 12,966 94.70 288.03 16 32 68
Sales (1) 73,237 12,966 21141 1.9e+05 2098 4417 11126
Variation in Sales 73,237 12,966 0.04 0.19 -0.05 0.04 0.13
Payment Incidents (PI) 73,237 12,966 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
R&D Share (2) 73,237 12,966 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Credit Constrained Firms (4)
No Employees 26,864 4,646 110.86 331.63 17.00 34.00 72.00
Sales (1) 26,864 4,646 24512 1.9e+05 1919 4113 10549
Variation in Sales 26,864 4,646 0.04 0.19 -0.05 0.04 0.13
Payment Incidents 26,864 4,646 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
R&D Share (4) 26,864 4,646 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non Credit Constrained Firms (5)
No employees 46,373 8,320 85.33 258.98 16.00 31.00 66.00
Sales (1) 46,373 8,320 19189 1.8e+05 2210 4589 11454
Variation in Sales 46,373 8,320 0.05 0.19 -0.04 0.04 0.13
R&D Share (4) 46,373 8,320 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
First Stage
No employees 51,656 11,392 98.30 292.25 17.00 34.00 72.00
New Bank Loans / VA 54,253 11,392 0.03 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.01
Long Term / Total Loans 54,572 11,367 0.39 0.38 0.00 0.27 0.77
Collateral (1) 51,656 11,392 15784 1.8e+05 688 1716 4939
Bank Debt / Total Financing 51,651 11,390 0.22 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.33
Note: (1) : Thousands of euros; (2) R&D share : R&D investment / (Physical Investment + R&D Investment);
(3) Capital Stock Growth Rate : It=Kt¡1; (4): At least 1 payment incident during the period; (5) no payment
incident during the period; Positive R&D investment rate for 24% of the total number of observations. Source:
Authors' computations from Fiben / Centrale des Bilans, Banque de France.
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32Table 3: E®ect of R&D on TFP Growth
Depvar: Average TFP Growth (t+2 to t+4)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Initial TFP -0.023a -0.024a
(0.001) (0.001)
R&D investment/VA 0.163a 0.074a
(0.018)(0.025)
R&D Invest./ Total Invest. 0.044a 0.012c
(0.004) (0.006)
Obs. 34596 36364 33627 35299
Adj. R2 0.033 0.025 0.035 0.025
Estimation OLS Within OLS Within
Note: Panel, within estimation. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%.
All estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported.
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34Table 5: Credit constraints and the cyclical composition of investment (1)
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
¢Sales(t) -0.016a -0.018a -0.020a -0.018a -0.020a -0.022a -0.021a -0.025a -0.026a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
¢Sales(t-1) -0.014a -0.016a -0.015a -0.017a -0.008a -0.009a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
¢Sales(t-2) -0.010a -0.011a -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PI(t-1) 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.005b -0.006b -0.005b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
¢Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.029a 0.030a 0.030a 0.021b 0.024a 0.022b
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
¢Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.017 0.018 0.018b 0.022b
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
¢Sales(t-2)*PI(t-1) 0.013 0.001
(0.010) (0.009)
No Obs. 73,237 62,159
No Groups 12,966 11,449
Estimation Within GMM
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sargan test (Â2) 603.57 607.59 510.85
Sargan test (p ¡ val) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Panel, within estimation. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%.
All estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported.
35Table 6: Second stage regressions with ¯nancial dependence and collateral
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment
Fin. Dependence Collateral
Low High Low High
(a) (b) (c) (d)
¢Sales(t) -0.021a -0.038a -0.027a -0.012a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
¢Sales(t-1) -0.012b -0.032a -0.019a -0.015a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
¢Sales(t-2) -0.013a -0.027a -0.010b -0.013a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
PI(t-1) 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
¢Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.026 0.049b 0.043a 0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.012)
¢Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) -0.001 0.011 0.029c 0.005
(0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014)
¢Sales(t-2)*PI(t-1) 0.000 0.049b 0.012 0.017
(0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012)
No Observations 20028 18457 36639 36598
No Firms 3403 3221 8212 6589
Estimation Within
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
36Table 7: Credit constraints and the cyclical composition of investment, asymmetry, Within
estimations (1)
Depvar: R&D investment / Total Investment
Decomposition by ¯rm (1) Decomposition by Sector (2)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
High ¢Sales(t) -0.020a -0.023a -0.021a -0.023a -0.017a -0.019a -0.018a -0.020a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Low ¢Sales(t) -0.008 -0.011b -0.014b -0.016a -0.010c -0.013b -0.016a -0.019a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
High ¢Sales(t-1) -0.015a -0.017a -0.013a -0.015a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Low ¢Sales(t-1) -0.012b -0.012b -0.013b -0.013b
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PI(t-1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
High ¢Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Low ¢Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.054a 0.055a 0.056a 0.058a
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
High ¢Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.024 0.024
(0.016) (0.016)
Low ¢Sales(t-1)*PI(t-1) 0.005 0.001
(0.021) (0.021)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
No Obs. 73,237 73,237
No Firms 12,966 12,966
Estimation WITHIN WITHIN
Note: (1) Decomposition by ¯rm: above (high) and below (low) ¯rm's mean sales' variation; (2) Decomposition
by sector: ¯rm above the third quartile of its sector's sales variation (high) or below the ¯rst quartile (low).
Panel, within estimations. Robust standard errors into parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All
estimations include year dummies. Intercept not reported.
37Table 8: Asymmetry, with initial state
Dep. var. R&D investment/ Total Investment
Est. (a) (b) (c) (d)
Initital State: High Low High Low
High ¢Sales(t) -0.002 -0.025a -0.013a -0.029a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
Low ¢Sales(t) -0.018a -0.027a -0.030a -0.008a
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
PI(t-1) 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
High ¢Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.025 0.007 -0.013 -0.008
(0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Low ¢Sales(t)*PI(t-1) 0.042b 0.060b 0.091a 0.028b
(0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021)
No. Obs. 34,360 38,877 32,656 36,863
No. Firms 11,563 12,597 11,099 12,074
Adj. R2 0.002 0.004
Estimation Within GMM
Note: High resp. low) state: sales per employee above (resp. below) ¯rms' median. Standard errors into
parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations include year dummies. Intercept and lag of
the dependent variable not reported for GMM estimates. All variables are in logarithms.
38Table 9: On the Level of Physical Investment
Dep. var. It
Kt¡1
(a) (b) (c)
Inv(t ¡ 1)=K(t ¡ 2) 0.058a 0.058a 0.058a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
¢Sales(t) 0.127a 0.127a 0.126a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
¢Sales(t-1) 0.095a 0.095a 0.095a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
PI(t-1) -0.013a -0.012a
(0.004) (0.004)
¢Sales(t) * PI(t-1) 0.007
(0.021)
¢Sales(t-1) * PI(t-1) -0.008
(0.023)
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
No Obs. 72,609 72,609 72,609
No Firms 12,877 12,877 12,877
Estimation Within
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations include
year and sector dummies. Intercept not reported.
39Table 10: Productivity, R&D and Credit Constraints
Dep. var.: MEAN TFP Growth (t+2) to (t+5)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Initial TFP -0.031a -0.031a
(0.001) (0.001)
Shock -0.063a -0.017 -0.037c 0.001
(0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.027)
Sect. R&D Intensity 1.104a 1.095a
(0.041) (0.042)
Shock*Sect R&D Intensity -3.936a -3.284b
(1.487) (1.575)
No obs. 33,973 33,973 33,973 33,973
R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
Est. OLS Fixed E®ects / Within
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. All estimations include
year dummies. Shock equals 1 if the ¯rm is credit constraint and has a negative shock in t, 0 otherwise. R&D
intensity : industry mean of R&D Investment / Total Investment.
40Table 11: Volatility, Growth and Credit Constraints
Est. : (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Dep. Var TFP Growth TFP Growth TFP Growth
High R&D intensity Low R&D intensity
Initial TFP -0.021a -0.020a -0.021a -0.020a -0.022a -0.022a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Growth Volatility 0.003 -0.037 -0.012 -0.074c 0.012 -0.015
(0.022) (0.028) (0.035) (0.039) (0.026) (0.038)
Growth volatility*Fin. Dep -0.033c -0.066c -0.018
(0.018) (0.037) (0.021)
No. Observations 4459 4459 2249 2249 2310 2310
R2 0.141 0.146 0.152 0.164 0.089 0.090
Note: Robust standard errors into parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: c10%, b5%, a1%. OLS estimations, over
the period 1994-2004; each estimation includes sector and size dummies. Rajan and Zingales (1998) data for
sectoral ¯nancial dependence. R&D intensity : industry mean of R&D Investment / Total Investment. Large
(resp. low) R&D intensity: above (resp. below) median of R&D intensity.
Table 12: Variables Description
Variable Description Source
New bank loans Total amount of new bank loans Centrale des Bilans, Banque de France (BdF)
Payment Incident 1 when the ¯rm experienced at least Observatoire des entreprises, BdF
one payment incident, 0 otherwise
¢Sales Log(sales)-Log(sales(t-1)) Fiben, BdF
Size Number of Employees Fiben, BdF
Collateral Sum of ¯xed and tangible assets Fiben, BdF
Banking Debt Banking debt / Fiben, BdF
(Own Financing + Market Financing + Financial Debt)
R&D Share R&D Investment / (Physical + R&D Investment) Fiben, BdF
41Table 13: Correlations
Variable Var. Sales PI Inv. Rate (1) R&D Inv. Rate
(2)
R&D Share (3)
Variation in Sales 1.0000
Payment Incidents -0.0416 1.0000
Investment Rate (1) 0.349 -0.0068 1.0000
R&D Investment Rate (2) -0.006 0.0331 0.2137 1.0000
R&D Share (3) -0.0041 0.0363 0.0611 0.7697 1.0000
Note: (1) Capital Stock Growth Rate : It=Kt¡1 ; (2): R&D Investment / Value Added; (3) R&D share : R&D
investment / (Physical Investment + R&D Investment); ; Source: Authors' computations from Fiben / Centrale
des Bilans, Banque de France.
42